Hans Blumenbergs Wirklichkeitsbegriff aus phänomenologischer Perspektive

E-Artikel

Zurück zum Heft: Phänomenologische Forschungen 2020-1
DOI: 10.28937/1000108511

EUR 16,90

Hans Blumenberg distinguished four different concepts of reality. On a first look, these reality concepts draw on a historical dimension. However, I try to show that they also allow for a systematic connection. Assuming a close link between Blumenberg’s thinking and (Husserlian) transcendental phenomenology, I consider the phenomenological conception of consciousness and its performances to be a guiding principle leading to such a systematic connection. Thus, one aim of my contribution consists in furnishing an epistemological approach to Blumenberg’s conception of reality. Then, I turn to the question as to how something finds its
way into the phenomenological process of constitution at all. Taking ‘self-evidence’ (Selbstverständlichkeit) and ‘non-self-evidence’ (Unselbstverst$ndlichkeit) as key notions, I scrutinize the way an object crosses the threshold towards phenomenality. In the conclusion, I try to lay out a minimum determination for that which is denominated ‘real’ from a phenomenological perspective.