Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Band 48

Why did Plato choose the word εδος as a technical term for his ›Forms‹? εδος and δéα were used synonymously in the common Greek language of the fi fthand fourth centuries, meaning in the fi rst place ›appearance, guise‹ of a person or of a thing, and then also ›type‹ of something, animate or inanimate, and ›wise,way‹ of doing something. None of these common meanings of the word εδος prepares for the application of the term which is encountered in the last part ofPlato’s Phaedo. In this essay, an attempt is made to show that the usage of εδος as it is applied in the Phaedo, as distinct from that of δéα, can only be understood against the background of the Pythagorean Philolaus; in a wholly different way, though, from what earlier scholars thought they had identifi ed as a Pythagorean background to Plato’s ›Theory of Forms‹.

Aristotle’s interpretation of χẃρα (= matter and space) has most often been regarded as an excellent example of his supposed inability to read otherphilosophers other than through the lenses of his own technical vocabulary and its implications. However, his reasoning is independent of his own take on the issue of prime matter, his claim is right, and it amounts to the thesis that χẃρα is neither matter nor space. It is shown how 209 b 6–17 is located within the largercontext of the Physics and its agenda concerning the issue of principles and causes of natural beings.

Most often, it has been maintained that Aristotle’s refutation of the thesis that space is matter or form is dialectically invalid. For, employing the notionof inseparability known from his critique of Plato’s theory of ideas, he uses assumptions that are peculiar to his own theories. However, Aristotle uses adifferent notion of inseparability (a part is »inseparable« from a whole if the latter cannot exist without the former), he lays out as a criterion for a properrefutation of the thesis in question precisely that it must not employ assumptions that are not shared by his opponents, and his refutation lives up to this standard.Lines 209 b 6–17 and 209 b 17–32 show that a major aspect of his development of his basic concepts in the Physics is precisely his effort to gain an interpretativeframework that does not impose his own theories unto other philosophers.

The political theory of renzheng (humane politics) plays an important part in the teachings of Mencius. It is based on his philosophical concept of human nature(xing) where he claims that human beings are born naturally good and that it is the task of every man, above all the task of the ruler, to know the innate moralgood and to realize it in his social and political activities. As a consequence of this concept Mencius in his renzheng theory vehemently opposes autocratic ruleand rule by force, favouring instead the idea of a benevolent government in the interest of the people and demanding the realisation of the lofty ideal of moral rulership. The implied idea that the ruler should be a sage is, in a way, comparable to the ideal of the philosopher king in Plato’s political theory. The importance of the renzheng theory was also recognised by certain Confucian scholars after the death of Mencius because they too considered it as a method to cope with specifi c political and social problems of their times. However, important parts of this theory were often ignored and even opposed by the leading and powerful fi gures in state and society who regarded it as dangerous for their own political interests. In the Song dynasty Mencius and his teachings became more and more important. In the 12th century the Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi supported the revaluation process of Mencius and the book Mengzi. As one result of his efforts the book Mengzi became beside three other books of early Confucianism the basic text for the civil service examinations. This article is focused on Zhu Xi’s political thinking which was obviously infl uenced by Mencius’ renzheng theory.

According to a commonplace, the modern use of the word »idea« traces back to Descartes through Locke. Descartes would have consciously given the word anew sense by using it to refer to contents of the human mind whereas medieval tradition reserved it to refer to archetypes in the divine intellect. – The commonplace is wrong. It wasn’t Descartes’ intention to give the word »idea« a new meaning. He rather intended a new theory of the human mind. To Descartes the word »idea« with the traditional meaning seemed attractive for this elaboration nas it unmistakably represents contents which do not derive from things already presumed.

In his System of the Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre) Fichte develops a farreaching and elaborately structured theory of sentiments which he puts at thedisposal of the self-enlightenment of the subject. This theory comprises the areas of theoretical, aesthetic, practical, sensual, intellectual, and intelligible life. Thesystematic track of the inquiry develops genesis, disposition, and function of the notion of sentiment in the Wissenschaftslehre and ist disciplines. From a historicalpoint of view Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is placed in its contemporary context (Neology, Philanthropism, Hommel, Kant, Jacobi). Its systematic and historicalaims are, seperated following their either genetic or factual coinage, traced from the genesis in the early writings unto the Wissenschaftslehre of 1801 and areunfolded parallel from an evolutionary perspective.

Recent discussions in the fi eld of anthropology indicate that the concept of normality has become an essential term to describe structural traits of humancondition. This article combines historical and systematic approaches to the phenomenon of normality. In the historical perspective it tries to show how theconcept has poured into the anthropological discourse from two equally relevant sources: the classical philosophy of life and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. In the systematic perspective the article shows how the traditional hiatus between the normal and the normative could be overcome by a specific interpretation of normality which refers to the ambivalence of life in itself. In order to guarantee that this kind of interpretation does not lead to either naturalism or essentialism, the article makes use of Georges Canguilhem’s insights into the semantics of the term ‚normality‘ which leads to a surprising redefi nition of the relation between the normal and its pretended opponents’ (the pathological, the abnormal etc.) In a final prospectus the essay tries to figure out the ethical consequences of a notion of normality which binds the idea of a fundamental life-ambivalence immediately together with the idea of life’s success.

Our contribution on the implied author concept has two main objectives. Our first aim is a historical one: to provide a faithful reconstruction of the circumstances in which the concept was introduced and to examine the responses it has met with in the course of subsequent developments. This reconstruction of the history of the concept provides the background against which we put forward a more precise way of understanding the implied author concept, without thereby departing completely from the ways in which it has previously been used.

This contribution discusses a phase in the history of the concept of ›structure‹ which is of great importance for the emergence of the ›structuralistic‹ methodologyin cultural studies. The concept of ›structure‹ was developed by the Russian phenomenological and hermeneutical philosopher Gustav Shpet in the 1920sas an important methodological tool of knowledge in cultural studies. Central importance is attached to the analysis of the ›structure of the word‹ which has aparadigmatic character for all socio-cultural research. Shpet transforms Wilhelm Dilthey’s idea of ›structure‹ into the concept of the structure of linguistic sensein terms of the philosophy of language and hermeneutics which was further developed in a ›structuralistic‹ sense by Russian linguists and literary scientistspreferably researchers of literature in Roman Jakobson’s circle.