Kants Organismusbegriff und seine Transformation in der Naturphilosophie F.W. J. Schellings

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Zurück zum Heft: Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Band 47
DOI: 10.28937/9783787336777_9

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Abstract
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After the exposition of I. Kant’s theory of nature as a mechanism, we turn to Kant’s idea that organisms are an exception and cannot be explained through the mechanism of nature. Organisms are characterized through a circular causality. The idea of the whole, an idea of the thinking subject, causes the functioning of organisms. F.W.J.Schelling takes up Kant’s conception that the organism is characterized through the interaction of the parts, but he dispenses with the idea of the whole as a causal agent. The part has a generative power to produce the whole. With this, Schelling’s Naturphilosophie suggests that mind depends on matter.