Fehler gefunden?
Erweiterte Suche
English Deutsch

Husserl on Intentionality and Attention

From the Logical Investigations to Genetic Phenomenology

Zurück zum Heft: Phänomenologische Forschungen 2018-2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.28937/1000108203
EUR 16,90

This paper discusses the role of attention in the phenomenological analysis of intentional experience in light of the problem of the relation between consciousness, intentionality, and transcendental subjectivity. Are these concepts equivalent? Or should we rather say that there is more to intentionality (and subjectivity) than consciousness? Does subjectivity embrace an unconscious domain? And, if so, how does this unconscious, yet intentional, life of subjectivity operate and how is it related to consciousness? In order to answer these questions, the paper tracks the development of Husserl’s conception of attention from the Logical Investigations to genetic phenomenology, by focusing on his analyses of temporality in the Bernau Manuscripts, on the relation between activity and passivity in the Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis, and on the issue of the self-constitution of subjectivity