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Erfahrung in Pragmatismus und Phänomenologie

Von der Erfahrung der Wirklichkeit zur Wirklichkeit der Erfahrung

Zurück zum Heft: Phänomenologische Forschungen 2019-2: Phenomenology and Pragmatism
DOI: 10.28937/1000108371
EUR 16,90

This article explores the ontological status of experience. It starts by pointing out the difference between pragmatism’s empirical and Husserl’s transcendental notion of experience. Even though pragmatism, just like phenomenology, claims that in experience the experiencing and the experienced, i. e., subject and object or, in Dewey’s terms, organism and environment, belong together and may have mutual impact onto one other, this pragmatic approach does not analyze the reality of experience itself but locates experience in the empirical world. Husserl’s analysis of transcendental consciousness reveals the constitution of the empirical world by experience and therefore takes a first step beyond pragmatism’s notion of experience. However, if the world is constituted by experience, then phenomenology will have to inquire into the constitution of experience itself. In the article this is called the experience of experience or the self-experiencing experience. Only when experience can be phenomenologically proven in its self-constitution does it no longer presuppose subjectivity, but can be interpreted as the selfconstitution of reality. This must be the actual concern of a philosophy that goes back to experience if it is not to stop halfway in its attempt to found both, speculative thinking and the empirically working sciences, in experience