Προαρεσις

Zur Einheit von Mittel und Zweck in Aristoteles’ Theorie praktischer Rationalität

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Zurück zum Heft: Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Band 52
DOI: 10.28937/9783787336722_2

EUR 16,90

Pροαρεσις is a central concept in Aristotle’s theory of practical reasoning and seems to represent a decision between two possibilities to act. Especially, it’s important to remark that προαρεσις doesn’t mean only the actual choice itself but rather a kind of dynamic intention over several contexts. There are three criteria of definition concerning this concept: (A) Pροαρεσις depends on an emotional forming of the actor’s character, that has the propensity to satisfy actual hedonistic desires but also aims to a reasonable kind of human existence in general. (B) General beliefs or customs about moral life need to be specialized by concrete practical ends, formed by practical reasoning. (C) Pροαρεσις represents a dual form of deliberation about means and about ends, that means context-sensible ends are only considered and evaluated in dependency with means and vice versa. Therefore we fi nd in Aristotle the idea of a specific human activity, which is displayed in the practical competence to fi nd autonomous decisions about the own life within a political and moral community. In this sense the sources of practical reason aren’t blind desires nor pure rationality but cultivated emotions, which serve as groundings of individual practical reasoning over means and ends.