Phänomenologische Forschungen 2014

In this paper I shall briefly analyze Husserl’s and Wittgenstein’s divergent reactions against the positivist stance on natural science and on the new cultural role that philosophy should play in relation to science. To a great extent, their philosophies can be considered as a departure from positivism, although for quite different reasons. I shall argue that Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, took positivism as a starting point that he tried to overcome from within. This endeavor led him to defend some theses of a pragmatist flavour as well as a peculiar type of radical agnosticism on ontological and epistemological issues. Husserl, however, considered that positivism was a dead-end for philosophy. Positivism has beheaded philosophy as a consequence of advancing a reductive view of science. Phenomenology is the attempt to understand the genetic and subjective processes that have ended up in an objective and scientific image of the world.

The question „what is reality?“ that opens Realontologie (1923), the establishing book in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (CM) oeuvre, establishes her realistic metaphysics. In her opinion, the firmly established „blinding insight“ in modern philosophy regarding the unfathomable contrast between the ideal and the real blocks any access to the question of reality. Her realontological philosophy seeks the „gate of reality“, meaning the datum-point where things „elevate“ themselves from non-existence or mere ideal existence but do not yet arrive at „operative Being“ or realistic fulfillment. CM identifies three characteristics of the real by which it meets the „task of Being“ imposed upon it to personally describe and fulfill the essence inherent in it: formationality (Leibhaftigkeit), self-standing and primordiality. The suggested interpretation of each of these three seeks to unravel the seeming contrast between the real and the ideal in favor of what she regards as the only genuine and primordial opposition that separates the real from nonexistence.

Both the current research literature and a tradition stemming from Husserl himself agree that it was Brentano’s notion of intentionality which „gave rise“ to Husserl’s phenomenology. I rely on extensive primary materials, including unpublished sources from four archives, to revisit this thesis. Already a survey of the historical circumstances of Brentano’s second decade in Vienna, when Husserl studied under him, hints at possible discrepancies in the reception of Brentano’s thought, which are further deepened by the editing policy employed by his orthodox students. I analyze an unpublished lecture manuscript of Brentano to find three different notions of intentionality, including a strikingly a-phenomenological one, which I then relate to the discussion by modern scholarship and try to identify those notions of intentionality which were encountered by Husserl as a student of Brentano. Given this heterogeneous matrix of influences, it is far from surprising that a closer look at Husserl’s philosophical juvenilia shows that he misunderstood Brentano’s notion of intentionality and attempted to employ it in a different theoretical context (maybe motivated by an idiosyncratic notion of inner perception). Finally, the notion of intentionality Husserl later attributed to Brentano was probably mitigated to him by indirect sources, including lecture manuscripts copied by the extravagant and less-know student of Brentano, Hans Schmidkunz, and a debate between a contemporary logician Christoph Sigwart and Brentano’s orthodox disciples. The analysis of these transmission mechanisms could reveal a distinct transformation which proved to be instrumental in the development of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. The allegedly decisive influence of Brentano’s notion of intentionality at Husserl thus seems to consist in a productive misunderstanding (which apparently corresponds to Brentano’s surprisingly dismissive evaluation of Husserl after Husserl’s departure from Vienna).

The purpose of my article is twofold: firstly, it indicates the structure aswell as the main characteristics of the phenomenology of Theodor Lipps; secondly, it brings to light its peculiar significance within the discussion of the time. The thesis that I put forward consists in two parts: Lipps develops a pure psychology, that is a phenomenology of spirit as a response toHusserl’s charge of psychologism posed in the Logical Investigations; in his opinion such a response is sustainable to the extent that it particularly emphasizes the metaphysical dimensionwhich distinguishes the phenomenological investigation.

This article suggests that the asymmetrical structure of the self-other relationship can be traced back to the relation between empathy and transcendental intersubjectivity. Drawing on Husserl in particular, I will first recapitulate the argument that empathy is necessarily preceded by, and built upon, structural implications to potential others, and I will then argue that the empathically encountered actual other is bound to arrive as the fulfilment or concretization of this anonymous, emptily appresented “anybody”. Because of this foundedness, empathy is necessarily built on expectations concerning the other’s similarity, and because of this initial and tacit “similarity thesis” it is bound to have an asymmetrical structure. Towards the end of my paper, I will underline particular ethical implications of this account. Most importantly,I will be claiming that genuine intersubjectivity, and ethical relationship with others, is essentially built on disappointments of our initial subjective expectations.

This article offers original phenomenological descriptions of empathy, sympathy, and compassion. These descriptions are based on empirical research, and they sample the variety of ways the subject may respond to the suffering of another person. The structure of these different, but similar ways of being are then taken up as clues hinting at a sensibility bearing on the formation of an ethical life. This sensibility is essentially twofold in character. On the one hand, a pairing of the perceived similarities between subject and other opens the subject to a resonance with the humanity of the other. On the other hand, the other’s expressive life awakens the subject’s interest in wanting to know the meaning of these expressions for the other or calls forth a caring regard for the well-being of the other. The ways of being represented by empathy, sympathy, and compassion may be viewed as different ways of organizing or rendering a precise form to the constitutive strands of the aforementioned sensibility. The relevant literature in phenomenology and ethics is commented on as it informs the discussion, but is kept to a minimum.

The „petite éthique” which Ricoeur develops in Soi-meme comme un autre is distinctive in its way of paying attention to the individual, the other and the society all at the same time. For this very reason the problem of the distribution of social goods is fundamental. Ricoeur tries to solve this problem through a synthesis of teleological and deontological considerations, and here the approach of Rawls occupies a central place. On the one hand, the attempt to solve this problem in the framework of a teleological approach draws on principles of justice which Rawls establishes through formal procedure; on the other hand, Rawls‘ position depends on a number of teleological presuppositions which are not compatible with his deontological approach. Ricoeur does not only attempt to refute Rawls, but to interpret his principles of justice as the result of a rationalisation of a sense of justice which is simply presupposed.

In the late 1950sHeidegger revived the notion of the ,ontological difference‘, which he considered to be the constitution for the meaning of both ,being‘ (Sein) and the ,entity‘ (Seiendes). The unifying process of this constitution bore the name ,discharge‘ (Austrag) and expressed the dynamic, static, and generic features of ,being‘. But even this new description means only the designation for the primordial unconcealedness (Unverborgenheit), which according to Heidegger is the ,matter of thinking‘ (Sache des Denkens). And again, Heidegger brings just another notion to express that the ,nearness‘ as the comprising meaning of presence (Anwesen) is the true name for ,world‘. Thus, Heideggers notions for ,being‘ as presence, ,staying dwelling‘, ,enowing‘ (Ereignis), and ,discharge‘ speak about his turning away from thinking of ,being‘(ontology) and his turning towards ,topology‘, where the relationship of ,world and thing‘ is preferred to the ,ontological difference‘ between ,being‘ and the ,entity‘.

The aim of this paper is twofold: The first part, drawing on Spinoza and Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, develops a broad outline of what might be called a metaphysics of immanence. In the second part, I will propose to understand phenomenology in the context of this metaphysics of immanence and I will point to some methodological and ontological shifts in phenomenological research this metaphysical interpretation might entail.

This paper discusses the performativity of Heidegger’s language. It tries to ascertain how Heidegger attains the appearance of phenomena by writing about them. This paper focuses accordingly on two questions: First, how is it possible to break out of language by means of words in order to make way for the unutterable, and second, how can what appears also disappear at the same time. The essay”The Origin of the Work of Art” (”DerUrsprung des Kunstwerkes”) is rife with examples inwhich Heidegger describes a phenomenon and analyses it as a possibility of making the experience of its particular”way of being” (“Seinsweise”). This paper examines in detail Heidegger’s attempt to provide a setting in which phenomena can appear in such a way that the assertion can be made that they show themselves”by themselves”.

The present article plays off two conceptions of the public sphere against one another. The first one sees in it a sign of what is already present in the private sphere, whereas the second regards it as a symbol that has to inscribe its own symbolic force into the private realm. That this is by no means a mere academic question becomes obvious by way of several examples analyzed at great length: the institution of mourning and the discussion about the presence of religious symbols in the public sphere. An argument for considering the Muslim veil as a protection against the divine is put forward in an attempt to clarify the presuppositions of our current predisposal against it. Ultimately, pluralism should perhaps not just be taken to refer only to the presence of others outside of us who we are able to numerically count, but might be the more difficult plight of having to cope with an otherness within each of us. Should the latter be the case, then we are in need of a public sphere where we can leave behind and thus honor what is not only differentiating us from others but also from ourselves.

Johannes F. M. Schick: Erlebte Wirklichkeit. Zum Verhältnis von Intuition zu Emotion bei Henri Bergson; Steven Crowell: Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger; Thomas Ebke: Lebendiges Wissen des Lebens. Zur Verschränkung von Plessners Philosophischer Anthropologie und Canguilhems Historischer Epistemologie; Klaus-Michael Kodalle: Verzeihung denken. Die verkannte Grundlage humaner Verhältnisse; J. Powell (Hg.): Heidegger and Language; Theodor Lipps: Schriften zur Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie.
4 Bände. Hg. v. Faustino Fabbianelli