Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, Bd. 67/2

There is hardly any other art form as immersive as film. Thus, if a movie focuses on the abyss of human behaviour, dealing with crimes, violence or even murder, it is often accused of being immoral and corrupting its audience. On the basis of selected examples from Alfred Hitchcock’s ›Rope‹ to Martin Scorsese’s ›Taxi Driver‹ and Lars von Trier’s ›Dogville‹, this critical essay explores the question of the moral claims movies can make. Considering contemporary films such as ›Promising Young Woman‹ and ›Joker‹ this text asks how modern anti-heroes influence the audience and what changes can be seen over the last decades in the moral reception of movies. Finally, the essay concludes with the latest attempts of censorship and looks at who determines the moral value of art.

The following paper aims at developing an understanding of Kitsch as an aesthetic vice, drawing mainly upon John Dewey’s ›Art as Experience‹. ›Does art have to be moral?‹ – the guiding question of this volume is addressed by reflecting on the specific operativity of art in moral terms. The genuine force of modern art and literature lies, contrary to a dichotomic view of the relation of morality and the arts, in showing the limits of concepts and values guiding the recipient and therefore activating processes of learning and reflection. It is then argued that Kitsch is the inversion of such an activity. Kitsch stabilizes moral convictions, value orientations, and thus ways of life by creating an image of the world that resonates with the latter. Following the observation that Kitsch has a manifest affinity for being used for ideological purposes, war – with focus on the current war in Europe – is considered a primal occasion for the thriving of the aesthetic vice.

Oscar Wilde reacts to the predicament of art in the face of an increasingly blasé public. He reverses the roles and sees his art as the reception of those who were formerly the recipients – according to the topos of the ›seeing work of art‹ (Früchtl). To receive Wilde means, first of all, to know oneself received. Wilde looks back colder than he or his art could be looked at. As the one being looked at, the audience is suddenly placed in the position of the work of art. It is confronted with aesthetic expectations that it cannot meet for systematic reasons. To aestheticize existence is to disavow it. Wilde does not educate his audience in this way, however. Instead, he educates them to become an audience. Nothing better should happen to the audience than to remain an audience. The cold look has been interpreted as amoralism. Yet Wilde is no good as an example of how even the morally reprehensible can be aesthetically legitimate. Instead, he demonstrates that the aesthetic is far less permissible than the ethical. Unethical things are already – and only – forbidden aesthetically.

Does art have to be moral? The first point that might be made is that this question is not necessarily a question ›in‹ aesthetics. Indeed, the philosophy of art should be considered as research into the concepts, implications, scope, and workings of artistic practise and reception. In that sense, the moral evaluation of art would be no different from the moral evaluation of any other human activity. All of the questions raised by the focus of this issue would thus remain essential, but would be beyond the scope of aesthetic theory. There is, however, a more fundamental point to be made. Contemporary philosophers give us very probing taxonomies of the various positions possible with respect to any ethical approach to art. But whether one opts for ›Autonomism‹, ›Moralism‹, or ›Immoralism‹, one could be drawn to acknowledge the operation of what I call the metaethical effect of art. This metaethical effect is not to be seen as the formulation of a specific message, moral, or value, but as the kindling and refinement of an awareness of the notion of value itself, and of the nature of evaluation, interpretation, and shared judgment. The argument would thus be that all works, be they moral, immoral, amoral, be they concrete and narrational or purely non-figurative and non-referential, provoke a reaction that teaches us the form of shared judgment.

The large-scale painting ›People’s Justice‹, a work by the artist collective Taring Padi, originally intended as an agit-prop artwork in Indonesia two decades ago, was publicly exhibited in Kassel in 2022 at the international art exhibition ›documenta fifteen‹. Public criticism declared the large-scale image to be an anti-Semitic machination and scandalized the art exhibition as a whole as marked by anti-Semitic activism. Taring Padi’s large-scale painting was first covered, then completely removed. – In our paper, we analyze the political problematic that set the matrix for the scandal and the organizational ethical aporia of a diffusion of responsibility: the organization of the art exhibition sought to maximize the curatorial freedom of the artist collectives, but in doing so increased the risk of dramatic reputational damage. Then we develop the specifically aesthetic problematic that the novel genre of ›post-autonomous art‹, so characteristic of ›documenta fifteen‹, makes particularly high demands on the ability to reflect on the difference between art and politics, as well as on cultural identities and differences, when post-autonomous art operates in multicultural contexts. These high demands affect not only the artists and curators, but also the real and virtual audiences of an open multicultural art exhibition. We identify some reasons why the high demands were not well met in the staging of ›documenta fifteen‹. Then we develop some suggestions within the normative framework of discourse ethics that reveal the deep normative aporias of such exhibitions and their difficult discourse culture and can be prospectively helpful. Finally, we briefly summarize the characteristic difficulties and aporias we have elaborated and end with an outlook on Aline Caillet’s art-philosophical concept of a specifically aesthetic responsibility.

The exhibition Critical Zones – Horizonte einer neuen Erdpolitik (2020–2022) at the ZKM Karlsruhe is a renewed attempt to unite artistic, philosophical, and scientific knowledge production in the medium of the ›Gedankenausstellung‹ (thought exhibition). The thematic orientation of the exhibition draws upon the writings of Bruno Latour, one of the curators. The article analyzes how his research on the critical zone, the terrestrial, and the Gaia hypothesis has been transformed into an exhibition format, intending a transmedial spatialization of thoughts combined with the visitor’s experience ›how to land on earth‹. Based on a detailed exhibition analysis, it examines the curation and mediation of Latour’s earth-political thoughts and concepts in both the physical exhibition and the digital exhibition platform that evolved in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.