Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, Band 55. Heft 2

The contribution attempts to integrate multiple perspectives of current largely heterogeneous graffiti scholarship. Referring to Bruno Latour’s concept »iconoclash«, we discuss graffiti from a cultural-theoretical point of view as a »version«. It appears as a semiotically oriented modification of spatially situated practices that regulate social life. Often, but not necessarily, these practices involve subversive qualities. The concept of »version« facilitates a non-normative and non-essentialist strategy of research. This enables an explorative research practice in which the complex matters of identity and space politics that are associated with graffiti can be addressed.

This article argues that the foundation of political theory in aesthetics by Jacques Rancière can be seen as an actualization of the slogan of fraternalism during the French Revolution. This actualization of fraternalism as »aesthetic community« gives Rancière the possibility to operate with the Marxian concept of classes without positively defining the experience of community. Because Rancière understands democracy as the chance for political intervention, the concept of an »aesthetic community« (as opposed to the traditional concept of classes) allows him to posit an endless process of political subjectification. To sharpen this argument, the article compares Rancière’s understanding of democracy to Jacques Derrida’s, who also focuses on a democratic struggle beyond democratic rules, but is very skeptical about the slogan of fraternalism.

This paper tries to argue the thesis that the painting Las Meninas by Diego Velázquez contains a reflection about art, which deals in the medium of painting with three of the most important problems of aesthetics: the problem of the artist, the artwork and its reception. In order to prove this thesis, the paper analyses the picture with the assumption that Velázquez worked in front of a mirror. Furthermore, the aesthetic problems detected in the painting are developed in terms of a philosophy of art, concluding with the question of how mirroring can be considered a model for the structure of the artwork in general.

How is aesthetic autonomy to be conceived if one does not want to lose an explanation of the connection between art and human practice in general? The starting point of the present paper is the claim that Hegel overlooks aesthetic autonomy because he wants to explain how art is operative within human practice. He does not conceive the sensuous-material aspects of art- works in their independence. Goodman’s notion of exemplification corrects this shortcoming. But his explanation of the relevance of independent sensuous-material aspects of artworks fails to give us an understanding of aesthetic autonomy, too. I argue that it is possible to avoid such a negative conclusion if one understands the self-referential constitution of sensuous-material shapings in an artwork as the basis of aesthetic autonomy. At the same time, such an under- standing allows for a conception of the potency of art within human practice.

Reflexivity does not presuppose linguistic articulation or even propositional content. If it did, art could not be called reflexive. Reflexivity can be found in the self-contact of the living, in mental reflection or in symbolic self-reference. Art is a medium which claims these different modes of reflexivity and intertwines them. Aesthetic reflexivity as such has been established by Kant and his epigones, following the model of transcendetal reflection. Thus it could be specified as the reflexive structure of aesthetic judgement, or as an emphasis on a work’s being created, or as a reference to perception itself in the process of perceiving, or as a way of reflecting concepts. Aesthetic reflexivity can only be detached from the model of transcendental reflection, if it is seen as oriented towards the interaction among the three modes of reflection mentioned above, leaving aside the difference, interplay or competition between perception and conceptual capacities.

This article analyses the relation between reflexivity and mediality (what makes a medium a medium) by presenting concrete situations of optical and specular reflections in literature and film, such as doubles (Doppelgänger) and split figures. Thus it can be shown that since the 18th century every medium is self-reflexive and that the concept of subjectivity has its basis in the interplay of reflexivity and mediality. The subject is an effect of medialitity as may be demonstrated by a new recapitulation of Foucault’s famous Meninas-interpretation.

The text examines forms of »pictorial thinking«, in particular with regard to artworks: thinking »in pictures« as analogous to thinking in words. It relates this topic to the concept of reflexivity in art. Three forms of aesthetic reflexivity are distinguished and related to each other (part I): reflexivity in the sense of reflecting, thematizing states of affairs outside the work: the world and./.or the self (R1), second: reflexivity as material self-reference within the artwork (R2), third: reflexivity as transformation of the subject in the process of the aesthetic experience (R3). The subsequent elucidation makes evident, that these forms of reflexivity never occur alone, but interact. Nevertheless, depending on the epoch and style of the work in question, distinctive emphases and accentuations arise, one of which generally dominates the others: (part II). As an upshot, the text suggests that this succession of reflexivity-forms from R1 to R3 mirrors developments in 20th century art (part III).

The paper discusses Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception as a phenomenology of art. The prevalence of examples from the arts in his text indicates that works of art possess the very same dynamic of reflexivity that the phenomenological project as a whole seeks to develop. Furthermore, by way of confrontation with works of art, the project is driven to transcend itself – or more precisely: to reflect itself. This »new style« of reflexivity may be discussed as »aesthetic incorporation.«

The reflexivity of images is often dealt with in theoretical discourse on art and image. Yet what reflexivity consists of and how it proceeds within images is seldom clarified. Following a basic idea taken from Niklas Luhmann, this article proposes a model of reflexivity, namely: Each self-reference often proceeds by a conspicuous iconic element, which is concretely determined within the visual arrangement and thus draws the beholder’s attention not to the image as a whole, but to one of its specific aspects. This model characterizes reflexivity as a dimension of iconic representation in general and distinguishes it from mere artistic reflection and thematic self-reference.

According to a widely shared notion, music is not only something that we can understand, but moreover something that gives us access to a specific form of cognitive reflection. This paper suggests that the first part of this notion is only plausible if musical understanding is not explained in terms of grasping the meaning of music, but in terms of experiencing its sense. Music has neither a classifiable meaning full content nor a predicative structure, both of which are necessary in order for a medium of reflection. Therefore, the second part of this notion can only be defended in a rather modest way, insofar as the cognitive function of music is limited to its role merely as a means that serves our otherwise language-based reflexive competence.