Scheitern

Humans have a natural tendency to categorise their actions as ›successes‹ or ›failures‹, and to focus on the former. This is true despite that fact that outside some few highly formalised contexts the meanings of these two terms are unclear and also, at best, ambiguous. Furthermore, in very many domains of human life failures turn out to be more interesting and more important than ostensible successes.

The article sketches two accounts of failure. On a broadly Aristotelian view, failure is conceived as the privation of success; on a view I call existential failure, failure and the capacity to begin anew are seen as explanatorily more basic than success. I distinguish three types of existential failure with regard to (i) individual existence, (ii) a cultural system, (iii) humanity as a whole. While the senses in which agents fail are different on each case, an underlying feature of failing in its different instances is its indirect affirmation of human freedom. To be free is to be capable of failure. I conclude by contrasting these two accounts with the scenario of human extinction. Is it a failure if our species ceases to exist? Drawing on Hans Jonas, I argue that here the contrast between excess and failure returns in a different form.

In this paper, conceptions of the failure of the human species in the philosophy of history that can be found in the thought of Marx, Benjamin, and Adorno will be presented. Before that, some aspects of Hegel’s metaphysics have to be recapitulated as background, even if Hegel’s conception of the philosophy of history cannot be inserted into the constellation spanned here. Finally, it will be discussed how the failure of the human species can be philosophically thematized beyond framings in a philosophy of history.

Can failure be aesthetic or artistic? How can failure be described as an aesthetic phenomenon or as a work of art? Starting from a concept of aesthetic experience and presence this paper seeks answers to said question in four steps. After defining the event ›failure‹ (I), its aesthetic potential is determined (II), and distinguished from failure as art and the artfulness of failure (III). Finally, the significance of the aesthetic experience of failure for its existential understanding is examined (IV).

Plato’s dialogues often end in a seemingly unsatisfactory conclusion, or aporia. Such aporetic endings are regularly interpreted as examples of Socratic irony, in which Socrates mocks his interlocutors by feigning ignorance and deliberately leading them into an aporia. Alternatively, they are seen as reflecting skepticism about the attainment of certain and consistent empirical knowledge. This paper revisits Plato’s Euthyphro and argues that the arguments and attempts at definition provide methodological criteria for the acquisition of knowledge and do not fail entirely, but only in certain aspects. It shows how a new, comprehensive understanding of piety can be developed by collecting the unrefuted, fragmented insights on piety from Euthyphro and integrating them with pieces of knowledge from the Politeia. The paper also explores the reasons for the deliberate presentation of failure in the Aporetic dialogues, namely to highlight the pitfalls of believing in one’s illusory expertise about something without fully understanding it, and thus to encourage the pursuit of sound, reliable knowledge by overcoming ›double ignorance‹.

Broken trust elicits two types of responses: On the one hand, an epistemic response: How could I be so mistaken? How can I learn to trust more appropriately? On the other hand, a moral response: How could you deceive me so deeply and hurt me so profoundly? Even though the response in a given case may be more epistemically or morally emphasized, their interrelation raises two theoretically challenging questions: (1) How can a unity of the epistemic and normative dimensions of trust be reflected in theories; thus far, these dimensions tend to diverge in predominant approaches that model trust either epistemically or normatively (e.g. evidential vs. assurance view). (2) How can it be understood that it is constitutive of trust that it can be broken, and that it is constitutive of trust that there is no risk in the very essence of trusting. The present paper proposes a response to these two questions.

Failure is a dramatic experience to be distinguished from mere lack of success. As a social process, failure is measured against the norms of the institutions within which failure occurs. The article uses four examples to examine whether failure necessarily involves self-attribution. When is it merely an external attribution? Failure would then be associated with self-deception, which initially protects the person who fails. The text identifies five phases that are typical of failure processes.