Matthias Wunsch

In Kant’s philosophy pure sensible knowledge and pure rational knowledge are regarded as heterogeneous domains. At closer consideration, however, a structural analogy between these two types of knowledge can be discovered: in both cases, the representation of the whole takes precedence over the representation of the parts. This is manifest in Kant’s claim that the epistemic function of limitation is decisive for both domains. It can be shown, furthermore, that in both cases the acts of limitation are the work of the power of imagination and hence originate from one and the same source. The power of imagination thus grounds a structural affinity (Verwandtschaft) between pure sensible knowledge and pure rational knowledge.

Philosophical anthropology offers two ways of structuring the concept of person, either by locating the essence of man in his being a person or by providing a bio- philosophy of personhood. Building on the work of Helmuth Plessner, this essay aims at conciliating both structurings. It argues for the thesis that personhood is the life-form of man and discusses the main structural features of human life-form.

Ernst Cassirer and Helmuth Plessner published their most important works in the 1920s. This paper explores the relations – both contentwise and methodological – between their conceptions of philosophy, contrasting the symmetrical terms ›anthropological philosophy‹ (Cassirer) and ›philosophical anthropology‹ (Plessner). The comparison focusses on the problem of philosophical self-reflexivity, which is central to the modern age of philosophy. When Plessner considers the basic concept of human lifeform (›eccentricity‹), it follows that the foundation and medium of philosophy is affected, while Cassirer develops his symbolic philosophical approach recursively within the medium of history of philosophy.