Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Band 64,1

Compared to movements elsewhere in Western Europe, the German Enlightenment is considered a latecomer and a fairly non-combative one at that. Using methods from the historiography of concepts, images, and metaphors, this article shows that a conception of Aufklärung as a form of intellectual improvement and a combative reform process emerged in the Germanspeaking lands shortly after 1700. It was decisive for the attractiveness of aufklären and Aufklärung that they found their origin in meteorological vocabulary; since the original meaning derives from the sun breaking through the clouds, the new cognitive meaning evoked visual associations that suggested an irresistible natural power of the desired reforms and a bright future. The study of the semantics and pragmatics of aufklären and Aufklärung spans from the early 17th to the mid-18th century. It is flanked by archive-supported investigations into the genesis of Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, the major lexicon of historical concepts conceived and co-edited by Reinhart Koselleck. Against Koselleck’s thesis that history can only be understood in terms of concepts, this article works with a broader basis of sources, including pre-terminological and metaphorical language use as well as programmatic images. It also inquires into influences from other languages (French, English, Latin). Finally, the reported findings are compared with Dan Edelstein’s and Antoine Lilti’s interpretations of the Enlightenment.

Habermas critically examines faith in the salvific promise of metaphysics, a notion based on the ancient and medieval conviction that the world is rationally determined in every respect, as it compares to the self-reflexive turn of thought towards itself in modernity. According to his account, modernity is the first period to analyze the means through which we cognize the world. However, a more rigorous comparison reveals that the construction of such an antithesis adheres to an antiquated blueprint. From the perspective of ancient metaphysics—Aristotelian metaphysics, for example— the hypothesis of an immediate acquaintance with things is epistemologically naïve. Thought does not first begin when things are given to it in »sensuous certainty.« Rather, a reflection on subjective acts of perception already demonstrates that perception is limited to distinguishing colors, sounds, and smells. It is unable, however, to distinguish things as they truly are. It is these acts of distinguishing, which precede all consciousness, that Aristotle investigates, particularly in their significance for all further cognitive acts. This marks the conceptual origin of a thought that presents things to itself versus an (empty) consciousness, which only commences its activity with reflection on what it has thus been (blindly) ›given.‹ Thus, what stands opposed in the history of European philosophy is not faith and reason, but rather two distinct forms of thought’s reflection on itself.

Interpretations of legal norms are abstract and general, as are legal norms themselves. They are if-then-statements about factual constellations and their legal consequences. Unlike scientific if-then-statements which predict what is expected to happen, legal if-then-statements stipulate what must or must not happen. But like scientific hypotheses, they cover an infinite universe and cannot be verified, only falsified. Therefore, there are no rules that have only to be followed to discover the right hypothesis or the right interpretation. That gives the context of discovery its characteristic freedom. In the context of justification, the discovery has to be tested against the potentially falsifying instances. Scientific hypotheses are falsified by consensus about how to understand reality. Legal interpretations are falsified by consensus about what the text of the norm says, about what the legislature intended, and about the compatibility of the interpretation with the rest of the legal system. The falsifying instances cannot reduce the competing interpretations to one. Since there can only be one decision, judges must choose.

In recent years, political theory seems to have rediscovered the concept of sovereignty. In the wake of internet policy discussions terms like »digital sovereignty,« »data sovereignty,« and »platform sovereignty,« have boomed. Associated with this is an idiosyncratic reception of the conceptual history of sovereignty and also a striking re-accentuation of the term itself. This contribution reconstructs the discourse by presenting two exemplary positions in the current debate, that of the digital ethicist Luciano Floridi and that of the political (internet-)theorists Christiane Pohle and Thorsten Thiel. In both cases, the assessment cannot be positive: the rediscovery of sovereignty driven by digital debates is neither conceptually nor politically convincing.