Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, Band 59. Heft 1

In this paper, I discuss Adorno’s critique of jazz to develop a metacritique. I explain the basic objection of Adorno against jazz which states that jazz performances do not realize a law of form and therefore are not able to challenge subjects. According to my diagnosis, Adorno’s assessment of jazz is based on his conception of art for, firstly, Adorno excludes interactions of contributing to a law of form and, secondly, has a one-sided account of how art reflects subjectivity. If one works out a conception of art that avoids these shortcomings it is possible to conceive of jazz as a paradigmatic form of art.

The aim of the paper is an analysis of the specific quality of jazz as a kind of artistic music. Three dimensions are brought forward as central for jazz music: improvisation, interaction and intensity. Even though these dimensions are not understood in terms of a definition – as solely necessary and jointly sufficient conditions –, they are meant to be central qualities in our appreciation of jazz music. The logics of improvisation are explored in contrast to the practice of performing a composed work in the European tradition of art music. Despite this difference the thought is articulated that the performance of a composed work is in some way governed by a similar logic. Interaction is specified in terms of jazz being fundamentally a kind of dialogical practice in the medium of music. Intensity finally is spelled out as a certain focus of jazz music toward every single moment of its performance that is mainly but not solely due to its specific rhythmic dimension. Jazz music proves to be a kind of artistic music that renders aspects of artistic practice in general explicit.

While improvised behavior is so much a part of human existence as to be one of its fundamental realities, in order to avoid the risk of defining the act of improvising too broadly, my focus here will be upon one of the activities most explicitly centered around improvisation – that is, upon jazz. My contribution, as Wittgenstein would say, has a »grammatical« design to it: it proposes to clarify the significance of the term »improvisation.« The task of clarifying the cases in which one may legitimately speak of improvisation consists first of all in reflecting upon the conditions that make the practice possible. This does not consist of calling forth mysterious, esoteric processes that take place in the unconscious, or in the minds of musicians, but rather in paying attention to the criteria that are satisfied when one ascribes to an act the concept of improvisation. In the second part of my contribution, I reflect upon the logic that governs the construction of an improvised performance. As I argue, in playing upon that which has already emerged in the music, in discovering the future as they go on (as a consequence of what they do), jazz players call to mind the angel in the famous painting by Klee that Walter Benjamin analyzed in his Theses on the History of Philosophy: while pulled towards the future, its eyes are turned back towards the past.

Improvisation gilt genreübergreifend als Charakteristikum von Jazzmusik, dessen Struktur zu verstehen eine zentrale Aufgabe der philosophischen Beschäftigung mit Jazz als künstlerischer Praxis ist. In diesem Beitrag analysiere ich, unter Verwendung grundlegender handlungstheoretischer Begriffe, insbesondere die Struktur der Interaktion zwischen gemeinsam Musizierenden. Ich argumentiere dafür, dass Interaktion bei Soloimprovisation ebenso eine Rolle spielt wie in verschiedenen Formen gemeinsamen Improvisierens und des Ensemblespiels. Damit wird ein Zugriff auf die Praxis der Jazzmusik entwickelt.

How do listeners experience Jazz? This is a question also about how Jazz music organizes the listening time. A classically educated listener expects a piece of music to structure, unify and thereby re-constitute the externally given time frame. Such an expectation is foreign to Jazz music which doesn’t relate the moment to a goal provided by a large scale structure. Rather, one moment is carried on to the next, preserving the stimulus potentially ad infinitum. How does such an organization of time affect the large scale form? The paper tries to answer this question by analyzing two examples which permit to trace the transformation of a classical form into a form germane to Jazz music.

In this essay I try to identify what is specific to jazz – or at least, mainstream or core jazz – from the point of view of its expression. Along the way I address the vexing question of the essence of jazz, and briefly explicate the concept of musical expression of emotion that I am working with. I next postulate a Gestalt of jazz, which I attempt to circumscribe both through its underlying musical characteristics and the use of paradigm examples, and suggest that such a Gestalt comports well with the expression of certain emotions and comports ill with the expression of other emotions. Before concluding I discuss the question of the expressive specificity of all genres of music.

In this paper I aim at discussing the aesthetic-normative conditions for the right understanding and the right evaluation of jazz. My main point is this: The aesthetics of jazz is an aesthetics of the successful performance, rather than an aesthetics of imperfection. The paper will be structured as follows. SectionI introduces the topic. SectionII presents the ›imperfection thesis‹, while III discusses some arguments against it. Sections IV and V investigate two related questions: the first is about the role of the »mistake« in jazz; the second concerns the crucial topic of normativity. At this regard I will maintain that the ›imperfection thesis‹ does not work, especially because it misunderstands the specific normativity of jazz as improvisational art. Section VI is devoted to clarifying both in which sense the idea of a normativity of the successful performance is sound and why this idea is important for understanding jazz. Finally (VII) I defend this view against possible objections.

This essay discusses the aesthetics of looking in Rilke’s middle period. To that end, it inquires into scenes of visual perception as represented by texts from that period. After a review of pertinent critical positions and a few terminological clarifications, a certain letter, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, and Archaïscher Torso Apollos serve above all as representative objects of inquiry. The general hypothesis is that looking proceeds here according to a reciprocal exchange of »imprints,« at the same time as a strangely displaced interplay of looks that destabilizes the scene. The main part unfolds this hypothesis by first considering the function of anxiety in this procedure, thus detailing the typical hierarchy of a Rilkean scene of looking. Subsequently, the focus lies on the Nachträglichkeit of looking in Archaïscher Torso, thus describing more closely the temporality of these scenes. All these aspects in fact invoke basic problems of both aesthetic theory and the philosophy of perception. Due to its design, however, the essay can address these theoretical problems only in an indirect and exemplary fashion.