Phänomenologische Forschungen 2025-1

Gadamer’s attitude to the modern perspectivism is remarkably complex. On the one hand, according to Gadamer, we need to acknowledge that our knowledge and action are bound to a particular point of view. On the other hand,being inspired by Plato, Gadamer invites us to rely on the capacity of dialogue to overcome our partial views. When speaking of the “fusion of horizons”, he both acknowledges and transcends perspectivism. The article reconstructs his analysis of the relationship between perspectivism and dialogicity in two contexts: history and art. The author introduces a distinction between two different uses of perspective in Gadamer: the distinction between perspective as given and perspective as task, between the perspective we are and the perspective we create. If we stick to the second option, as Gadamer sometimes does,language (dialogue) can no longer be seen as a way of overcoming perspectives (as one reading of the “fusion of horizons” suggests), but as a way of creating perspectives.

In his Zürich Lectures from 1997 W.G. Sebald argued that there is a lacuna in German literature concerning the Allies’ firebombing of German civilians and German cities during WW2. According to Sebald, the German writers did not write about what they had been witnessing and thereby they failed to convey the traumatizing events into the memories of a whole generation. In cases where a group has experienced and participated in traumatizing events, the memory of these events might be distorted, misrepresented or not represented at all in the collective memory. I want to consider whether in such cases we can talk of collective amnesia, as it allows me to focus on some of the mechanisms at stakeincollective memory. Further, I will argue that what I call “memory work” involves an active commitment to self-under-standing also at a collective level. Once we understand the notion of memory work better, we can understand why and how it is ethically motivated. The notion of memory work will prove to be relevant beyond the study of collective memory itself; I will argue that memory work is a necessary condition for making a sincere and genuine public apology and thereby to propose a reconfiguration of the landscape of collective memory.

Animal psychology at the beginning of the 20th century was in the state of a pre-paradigmatic science (Thomas Kuhn). As a result, the philosophical implications and guidelines of research were more clearly in the foreground of the research programme than in later phases of behavioural research. Using Helmuth Plessner’s philosophy of nature or biophilosophy as a case study, this article examines the influence of a phenomenologically oriented animal psychology. WithinPlessner’s oeuvre, the structure-forming relationships between the “Deutung des mimischen Ausdrucks” (1925) and the "Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch" (1928) build the core interest of this investigation.

This article presents a description of the valuing actsbased on the concept of affect (Affekt) that Husserl addresses in the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. I begin by examining certain approaches to feelings that Husserl develops in his work, especially those in his major works Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen I (1 and 2). As I show, his various analyses lack an in-depth description and have an intellectualistic character (3), in contrast to what is contained in the manuscripts of the Studien. Taking this into account, I discuss different moments in the process of valuing (4) in order to discover, delimit and describe in detail the experience that Husserl calls Affekt (5). Although Husserl characterises it as an affective reaction – a kind of affective state -, he recognises in it a distinct intentionality, which I critically examine from three perspectives (6), concluding that the Affekt –together with the turning towards of the ego –is already a valuing (7). Finally, I argue (8) that in order to speak of a valuing in the strict sense of the word –in the sense of a Wertnehmung-, a change of attitude (Einstellungsänderung) towards the Liking-attitude (Gefallenseinstellung) is necessary, which allows a more precise interpretation of the Husserlian concept of Gefallen. The analysis of value acts on the basis of the concept of affect represents a descriptive extension of the traditional understanding (apprehension-content of apprehension model), which invites further research into the possible differences and tensions that arise from it.

This article discusses the concepts of dwelling elaborated by Eugen Fink and Emmanuel Levinas. Both think human dwelling as both occuring inside infinity and taking its measure from it. However, both differ in the way infinity and thus ethical dwelling is conceived. Concerning Levinas, the article focuses on the concept of dwelling developed in Totality and Infinity. It presents it via the stations of the birth and individualization of an individual, subjectivity’s expansion via the house and economy as well as the culmination of dwelling in receiving the guest. Subsequently, it presents Fink’s conception of dwelling. Via his notion of physis, the article discusses his cosmological notion of world, the locus of human dwelling. Dwelling, in turn, is presented through Fink’s notion of the ideal, his concept of basic phenomena and the co-existentiality of custom (Sitte). The article concludes with an extensive comparison of Levinas’s and Fink’s approaches.

This paper addresses the question of the language/world relationship through the examination of the case of material countersense (Widersinn), as presented in Husserl’s genetici nvestigation of logic. By tracing judgments back to their pre-predicative origin, Husserl uncovers that even formal logical principles presuppose the a priori reference of judgments to the harmonious unity of experience. Material Widersinn is crucial here, as judgments in this sphere violate the a priori lawfulness of the pre-predicative dimension. Husserl thus considers them as impossible judgments, depriving them of cognitive value. Yet, one might ask whether a different conclusion could be reached. Ricoeur offers a metaphorical interpretation of countersensical expressions, revealing their heuristic potential in disclosing the ontological depth of reality. This reinterpretation opens a broader perspective on the interplay between language and experience, as well as a different conception of knowledge and truth itself.

Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation has been analyzed more than most other texts by Husserl, usually with a critical eye toward how he describes his relation with another subject as similar to himself. Instead of reading this work through such a critical lens, or even through his phenomenology of intersubjectivity, though, I argue that important terms that Husserl employs here are ones that receive much attention in his analyses of passive synthesis. Terms such as “pairing” and “association,” in other words, have key positions in passive synthesis, and thus it is worthwhile to include Husserl’s analyses of passive synthesis—and related terms—in an interpretation of his descriptions of intersubjectivity. I thus begin with a textual analysis of Husserl’s use of association and pairing and how these are interconnected with the notions of affectivity and awakening. I then inquire into what, exactly, might be “awakened” when we experience an intersubjective encounter. While such considerations might not address all problematic issues with the Fifth CM, I hope that they can demonstrate that Husserl’s descriptions of intersubjectivity are deeper and more effective than is usually presumed.

Rudolf Otto’s seminal The Idea of the Holy rests uneasily between Neokantianism, Psychology and Phenomenology. This paper aims to contribute to a richer understanding of Otto’s thought by highlighting its phenomenological themes. Relating the work to its predecessor, The Philosophy of Religion based on Kant and Fries, two strands of interpretation are identified that emphasize Otto’s turn against or consistency with Kantianism, respectively. By analyzing Otto’s notion of ,schematization‘ as a condition of possibility for religion, I argue that the Holy indeed marks a turn away from a Kantian framework. Consequently, I propose a phenomenological reading of the Holy, primarily drawing on Scheler. I explore Otto’s notion of feeling as well as his understanding of a priori, arguing that the latter should be understood as a material a priori. Thus, I aim to shed light both on Otto’s concept of the numinous as an a priori category as well as his concept of schematization.