Phänomenologische Forschungen 2024-1

In this article we attempt a phenomenological analysis of the climate crisis. We start by arguing that the climate crisis cannot appear as a regular phenomenon. Due to its over-temporality and catastrophic character it is a non-phenomenon. However, we contend, this non-phenomenon announces itself in the hyperphenomenon of heat-waves. We analyse heat as a phenomenon and then show how it becomes a hyperphenomenon in the form of heat-waves. Besides the scientific evidence for prolongued and more extreme heat waves being due to the climate crisis there is a question of how they can be experienced in everyday life as connected to climate change. We argue that, if heat-waves reach extreme temperatures, go on for an unusual long time and are combined with uncommonly high temperatures in winter, we experience, bodily and structurally, a falling apart of our normal order of experience. This experience can motivate an experienced understanding of the climate crisis because it resonates with the overtemporality and catastrophic character of the climate crisis. We therefore understand it as an announcement of the crisis despite its withdrawal.

In this paper, I analyze the ambiguity of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of repression with regard to the future dimension of human existence: The repression of personal existence by the habitual body can disable the future and enable it. I proceed in three steps: First, I redescribe the cases of pathological repression cited by Merleau-Ponty as a refusal to give up a closed horizon of possibility: Clinging to a past present leads to stagnation and ultimately to the desubstantialization of existence. In the next step, I address the role of what I call non-pathological repression – a general phenomenon we can understand as a condition for having any future at all. I conclude by arguing that the distinction between future-opening and futureclosing repression is not always clear. As agents who evaluate their own existences, we can at times feel unsure whether we are persistently pursuing a worthwhile goal or are pathologically clinging to an impossible future.

This article reassesses the notion of personal identity over time from a Heideggerian perspective, aiming to bridge the conceptual gap between concerns for personhood and continuity. Traditional approaches, including the psychological and moral approaches to the self, often inadequately address the relationship between personhood and temporal continuity. This article establishes an understanding of personhood as social agency, contending that this perspective encompasses both conceptual dimensions central to the question of personal identity over time. Following an initial exploration of the problem (§ 2), a concept of social agency rooted in Heidegger’s notion of Dasein is developed in comparison with alternative conceptions of personhood (§ 3). Subsequently, drawing on Arthur Danto’s philosophy of history, Heidegger’s perspective on personal identity over time is examined with a focus on historicity (§ 4). Lastly, this account is compared with contemporary views on personhood and identity over time (§ 5).

The following offers a critical appraisal of the themes of self-directedness and self-relatedness in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. It does so through an examination of solitude as a moment of what I call self-solicitude which, while emerging from and responding to various forms of otherness and encounter, has an ineliminable singularity to it that Gadamer misses. The case is made that Gadamer’s critique of subjectivity causes him to neglect the singularity of such selfdirectedness and self- elatedness and, by extension, to undervalue the importance of solitude when outlining a hermeneutics of the self. The aim is to offer a course correction to Gadamer’s own course correction, both endorsingmany of his readings, while also pressing him on where he fails to examine more thoroughly the experience of returning to oneself and getting on with oneself in self-understanding and solitude.

The following is about the question of whether there is such a thing as a real ego or not, and what practically follows from this. More precisely, it is about the question of what a corresponding belief means for the self-relationship of a subject. I deal critically with the positions of Michael Hampe, Jay L. Garfield and Dan Zahavi and try to substantiate two theses. First: There is a real ego and everyone is identical with his ego. And secondly: Belief in the ego tends not to lead to more, but to less egocentrism and egoism.

This article compares the concepts of judgment of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida. At first glance, there are a number of striking parallels between the two. Both draw on Immanuel Kant’s reflections on judgment but reject his transcendentalist premises and his exclusive focus on aesthetic concerns in order to turn judging into a practice at the intersection of law and justice. Beneath these parallels, however, there are significant differences. This, we argue, is nowhere clearer than in Arendt’s and Derrida’s contrasting positions on the death penalty. The article is structured as follows. We begin by outlining the main features of Arendt’s theory of judgment and then turn to her thoughts on the trial against Adolf Eichmann, which we consider a radicalization of this theory. We show that although Arendt claims that it is our sense of justice that demands that Eichmann be brought to trial, she ultimately does not clarify what a just verdict might be in his case. Instead, she opts for the death penalty as a last resort for dealing with those who have committed crimes against humanity. Next, we discuss Derrida’s reflections on judgment. For him, the tension between law and justice is asymmetrical. Law should be understood as arising from the demand of the Other and must always remain responsive to it, despite its attempts at universalization. From this it follows, according to Derrida, that judgments ought to be open to criticism and revision. Since the death penalty does not meet this requirement, it must be rejected.

The article discusses why the notion of infinity is indispensable in contemporary phenomenology. I will heavily rely on some of L(szl) Tengelyi’s ideas, who in his turn uses Marc Richir’s early works on Cantor and Kant. Although – similarly to Richir and Tengelyi – I also examine some of Cantor’s ideas, I concentrate on a different and more fundamental part of his theory than Tengelyi and Richir.

Phenomenological analysis traditionally focuses on the body as a phenomenon from a first person perspective. In feminist phenomenological thought, this has provoked a debate about whether only someone in the situation of being a woman can speak about a woman’s body. I want to discuss the challenges and the possibilities that a phenomenology of gendered bodies entails. A phenomenology that aims to raise awareness not only of the singularity and specificity of gendered bodies and the gender norms shaping their experiences, but also of their differences and similarities, can benefit from critically reconsidering and enhancing the first-person approach. I will claim that the phenomenological focus on first-personal investigations does not need to be abandoned entirely in order to engage with gendered bodies in a non-essentialist and critical way, but can be fulfilled byway of an aesthetically framed concept of empathy (Einfühlung).

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