Phänomenologische Forschungen 2006

Ina Schmidt: Vom Leben zum Sein. Der frühe Martin Heidegger und die Lebensphilosophie; Julia Jonas: Der phänomenologische Text. Eine Studie zu Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger und Franz Kafka; Rudi Visker: The inhuman condition. Looking for difference after Levinas and Heidegger; Anselm Böhmer (Hg.): Eugen Fink. Sozialphilosophie – Anthropologie – Kosmologie– Pädagogik – Methodik; Frank Schalow: The incarnality of being. The earth, animals, and the body in Heidegger’s thought; Lambert Wiesing: Artifizielle Präsenz. Studien zur Philosophie des Bildes

The French philosopher Jean Cavaillès conceived a theory of science primarily concerned with the aspects of historicity and autonomy of the scientific development. Even though he criticized Husserl’s phenomenology in his last work, his method can, in its main features, be characterized as phenomenological. The idea of what may be called a transcendental theory of understanding presents itself in this light.

The aim of this paper is to illustrate the fundamental function of the affection at the most elementary level of the constitution of objectivity. Husserl’s phenomenology has been often accused of articulating unilaterally the experience insofar as it has identified the dimension of authentic phenomenality with the sphere of immanence. This criticism is certainly legitimate, but it does not lead to overlooking some tensions that belong to the Husserlian philosophy. In this sense I will show through an detailed analysis of the affection in the Husserlian phenomenology that a “ec-centric” dimension comes into light, that questions radically the process of immanentisation. In this context it is not only essential to distinguish the different forms of affection (especially to differentiate the affection from the tendencies of affection), but also to determinate in a precise way the relation between affection and answer.

Modernity has survived postmodernism. ‚Postmodernism‘ as a term has ceased to be modern. Is this justified? My thesis is that we still remain in postmodernism and at the same time have left it behind: While it has been dismissed as a positive idea, its irritating diagnosis of a pluralization of world, text and, particulary, speaking subject preserves its value. From a phenomenological point of view, Roland Barthes’ insistence on the individual body of the writer and reader can be understood as a reaction to the postmodern de-personalized concept of texts – as a challenge to speak with one’s own voice.

Husserl discovered that the phenomenon of time cannot be analyzed in terms of objective temporality. The intuitively given succession is not one of worldly objective time, but rather of the time of consciousness itself. Here it seems that the successive phases can exist together, such as they are given together in intuition. This poses the problem of how the time of consciousness can appear in its own course, that is, how to understand the relation between the time that appears and the process of its appearing. Can time perception be understood as a temporal self-perception of consciousness?