Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri

ABSTR ACTS
Simon Noriega-Olmos: ›Not-Being‹, ›Nothing‹, and Contradiction in Plato’s Sophist 236D-239C
At 236D-239C, Sophist presents three arguments to the conclusions, that the expression ›not-being‹ does not say or expr [...]

Aristotle gives an account of pleasure in two different treatises of the Nicomachean Ethics. In book VII he identifies pleasure with the pleasurable activity, while in book X he treats pleasure as something different from the pleasurable activity. These two treatises give two ways to study pleasure from a philosophical point of view. We can ask for the conditions that an activity must fulfil to be pleasurable (what is pleasurable: book VII) or we can ask for the metaphysical category of pleasure (what is pleasure: book X). In this paper I try to answer to these questions and to approach to Aristotle’s concept of pleasure, relating the concept of ›ἐνέργεια’‹ that Aristotle uses in book X with the self-perception and the perfection of the vital activities.

In this paper I try to explore Plato’s concept of power in the first book of the Republic as opposed to Thrasymachus’.I argue that the core of Thrasymachus’ position is not to be found in his definitions of justice, but in his concept of power and, in this sense, he has a coherent philosophical position. I also claim that although Plato does not explicitly develop a concept of power, it is possible to find it in his arguments throughout the dialogue. Moreover, the link Plato establishes between power and knowledge is going to play a big role in the entirety of his political philosophy.