Eva-Maria Düringer

Im englischsprachigen Raum gilt Iris Murdoch (1919–1999) längst als Klassikerin – nicht nur der Literatur, sondern auch der Philosophie. Ihr Werk inspiriert eine international aktive Interpretationsgemeinschaft und hat insbesondere der mor [...]

This article examines Iris Murdoch’s rejection of teleology in moral philosophy, focusing on her striking claim that »the only genuine way to be good is to be good for nothing.« At first glance, Murdoch’s denial of an external telos appears to clash with her insistence on moral progress and her portrayal of the Good as a »transcendent magnetic centre.« The essay explores these apparent tensions through a threefold approach: first, by situating Murdoch’s remarks within her own writings on morality and transcendence; second, by comparing her Platonist orientation with the neo-Aristotelian accounts of Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Elizabeth Anscombe, her contemporaries in the so-called »Wartime Quartet«; and third, by proposing an alternative resolution through Murdoch’s notion of purification, developed in dialogue with Simone Weil. The article argues that Murdoch’s view ultimately avoids contradictions: while human life lacks an external purpose or reward, the orientation towards the Good purifies perception and motivation without rendering life teleological. In this way, moral improvement is not a form of compensation but an uncompromising practice of attentiveness, which preserves the radical character of being »good for nothing.«