Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Band 67,2

This introductory essay outlines the programmatic proposal of a critically enlightened and trans-culturally broadened conceptual history. Taking the concept of knowledge as a test case, the authors argue that traditional philosophical conceptual history remains shaped by systematic exclusions, including Eurocentrism, androcentrism, and the marginalization of certain epochs and traditions. The essay contends that conceptual history should not only reconstruct semantic developments but also critically examine the social and political conditions—and the power relations—under which concepts are formed and sedimented. Drawing on debates in feminist and social epistemology, it defends the epistemic value of diversifying the corpus of conceptual- historical inquiry. A trans-culturally broadened approach, the authors suggest, can uncover neglected alternatives, expose contingent conceptual narrowings, and contribute to contemporary debates. The introduction concludes by presenting the three case studies—on Arabic-Islamic philosophy, late medieval thought, and Zen Buddhism— as exploratory steps toward a reoriented practice of conceptual history.

This paper examines two competing concepts of knowledge that gradually emerged within Arabic-Islamic philosophy (alongside other competing concepts) during the ninth and tenth centuries. In a first step, it outlines the concept of knowledge as understood by Aristotelians (falāsifa) such as Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950), that is, thinkers who, as the Arabic term indicates, were directly influenced by ancient Greek philosophy. Due to its structural similarities to contemporary European-American conceptions of knowledge, the Aristotelian notion provides a useful point of contrast for the second conception of knowledge, which constitutes the primary focus of this paper. This second concept is based on a different worldview – semiotic and relational – first fully articulated in writing through the works of Abū ʿUthmān al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 868). In contrast to the Aristotelian view, this conception of knowledge offers a serious alternative to the paradigm prevalent in philosophy as an academic discipline today. Drawing on this alternative, the paper concludes by reflecting on its potential significance for the present.

This article examines a distinctive conception of knowledge developed in the later Middle Ages, focusing on Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) and his followers Lambertus de Monte (d. 1499) and Magnus Hundt (d. 1519). It reconstructs an understanding of knowledge that was already unusual in it original context and remains unconventional today, yet becomes plausible once the problem it addresses is properly understood. Central to this approach is a close connection between concept and thing: both are understood as expressions of the same reality, albeit in different modes. This ontological proximity has far-reaching consequences for epistemology. Knowledge is not conceived as a mere collection of facts but as a way in which reality articulates itself through concepts, which themselves are part of that reality. A discussion of the theses of the Swiss mathematician Ferdinand Gonseth (1890–1975) serves to clarify the philosophical problem at stake in the medieval context.

This article examines how the Zen Buddhist tradition has conceived of the relation between intellectual knowledge and holistic wisdom. It begins with some reflections on Aristotle and the history of Western philosophy in order to pose the metaphilosophical question of whether, in modern times, philo-sophia has become more narrowly philo-epistēmē. With this critical question in mind, and in order to approach the Zen Buddhist tradition’s very different understanding of the nature of knowledge and the pursuit of wisdom, the article turns to two modern Japanese philosophers of the Kyoto School who were Zen practitioners as well as scholars of Western philosophy, Nishida Kitarō and Nishitani Keiji. The remainder of the article is dedicated to investigating how the Zen tradition—by drawing on and developing Mahāyāna Buddhist (and also Daoist) texts, teachings, and practices—has sought to reveal not only the limits of knowledge but also the delimiting effects of acts of knowing. Moreover, it discusses how Zen meditation and other forms of holistic practice are intended to awaken and cultivate a wisdom that enables one to intuitively understand when, where, and how to employ this or that perspectivally delimited form of knowledge.

This article offers a metacritical examination of the programmatic proposal for a »critically enlightened and trans-culturally broadened conceptual history« advanced in this issue. While acknowledging the legitimacy of contextual, trans-cultural, and diversity-sensitive perspectives, it questions the generalized diagnosis of systematic exclusion in so-called traditional philosophical conceptual history. Focusing in particular on the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie as a representative case, it argues that claims of Eurocentrism, androcentrism, and selective treatment of historical epochs overlook substantial historiographical achievements and methodological differentiations already present in the field. A comparative reading of the contributions assembled under the programmatic framework further reveals a gap between theoretical ambition and historiographical practice. The article concludes that the call for a fundamental reorientation of philosophical conceptual history risks overstating both the deficiencies of existing scholarship and the integrative coherence of the proposed alternative.

From 1811 onward, Schelling develops a philosophy of time centered on the idea of a ›system of times‹. This paper reconstructs the motivation for this concept in Schelling’s critical engagement with Kant and interprets it as an ›organism of times‹ integrating metaphysical, cosmological, historical, and individual dimensions. In doing so, it elucidates how Schelling reconfigures the notion of system in order to account for the internal differentiation and dynamic unity of temporal structures.

Over the past half century, a new concept of the future has emerged that has so far received surprisingly little systematic attention. Its roots can be traced back to theological and existentialist thought of the interwar period, a context in which a new awareness of historical temporality first took shape. This concept of the future no longer refers primarily to what will presumably happen, but rather to what present actors, on the basis of specific visions and expectations, take to be going to happen. While such a view rightly acknowledges the temporal embeddedness of all determinations of time, it also entails the risk of an abdication of responsibility for the future as such.