Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Band 66,2

This article examines the role and significance of archives, with a focus on literary archives, through the framework of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Drawing on Gadamer’s epistemological and methodological maxim—that every transmitted statement should be understood as an ‘answer’ to a ‘question’—it highlights the essential infrastructure archives offer within this interpretative context.

This essay compares Gadamer’s reflections on the humanities, programmatically outlined in his 1983 essay Die Zukunft der europäischen Geisteswissenschaften, with related ideas from Husserl, Valéry and Derrida. While Gadamer, Valéry and Derrida use Husserl’s Krisis-Fragments as a foil, they all distance themselves from Husserl’s pessimistic diagnosis of culture and science. Valéry does so in a critique of Europe, whereas Gadamer and Derrida offer more apologetic perspectives. On the the role, mission and mandate of the humanities, the authors remain notably vague. However, Gadamer and Derrida converge in their appreciation for the methodological strengths of the humanities – historical reinterpretation, critical reading, hermeneutic pluralism – which they regard as politically indispensable for “Europe.” Despite this shared perspective, Derrida frames his argument in ethical-political terms, while Gadamer adopts a science-oriented approach to define the role of philosophy.

The role of classical philology in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is multifaceted. Gadamer critiques a version of classical philology that merely aims to archive ancient evidence. To transcend the narrow, positivistic approach, he proposes integrating philology into philosophy— on the condition that it combines rigorous textual analysis with a philosophical interpretation of the content, while also considering the relevance of the texts for their present-day recipients. This demand is particularly pronounced in his interpretation of Plato’s dialogues. The philological method that Gadamer learnt primarily from Paul Friedländer proves to be essential for the development of his hermeneutic theory in his early works, in Truth and Method and in later essays. As this paper argues, Gadamer was not the first one who required that philologists should consider the aspects of philosophical relevance and recipient orientation. In antiquity, the question was discussed why certain texts are preserved, how they should be read and what benefits recipients can derive from reading texts like Plato’s dialogues. The modern discussion between philologists and philosophers about supplementing the Alexandrian philological method with the aspects of philosophical relevance and recipient orientation is thus part of an ancient tradition.

Gadamer’s epilogue to the third edition of Truth and Method contains a succinct critique of the forgetfulness of language in the humanities, insofar as they fail to recognize that their investigations are aimed at a simultaneous articulation of the ,significance‘ [Bedeutsamkeit] of what is being investigated. The presentation of the questions under discussion, Gadamer argues, requires a simultaneous presentation of the perspectives from which they are treated. In this respect, Gadamer sees the constitutive role of the rhetorical use of language within and outside the sciences. His rehabilitation of rhetoric puts Gadamer at odds with Heidegger’s hierarchical understanding of language – and places him in the company of Herder, Humboldt and even Adorno. The article argues that Gadamer’s defence of rhetoric, taken literally, implies a rejection of the assumption of the primacy of language over speech and thus of an authoritarian view of language.

This contribution examines the evolution of historical understanding through the lens of perspectivity and interpretation, highlighting the contributions of Johann Gustav Droysen, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and contemporary debates. Droysen emphasized forschendes Verstehen (“understanding through research”) and the importance of subjectivity in historical inquiry. Gadamer, while critical of Droysen’s research-focused understanding, proposed historical interpretation as a dialogical process, culminating in the “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung) that integrates past and present perspectives. In recent scholarship, figures like Dan-el Padilla Peralta advocate for the “decolonization” of classical studies, addressing racial biases and encouraging greater political engagement. While these efforts can enrich the discipline, critics warn of potential compromises to academic rigor. Both Gadamer and Droysen, however, stress the inseparability of historical interpretation from present contexts. Gadamer’s dialogical approach offers a nuanced framework for engaging with antiquity, resisting dogmatism while embracing the diversity of scholarly traditions. This perspective remains vital in addressing the epistemic and ethical challenges faced by modern historical sciences.

Gadamer’s influence on legal science has been widely analyzed, yet there remain areas in which the unique value of his thought for understanding law and its application has not yet been fully explored. One such area is the perspective of ontological hermeneutics, i.e. the question ofhow legal understanding contributes to the development of the jurist’s professional character—in other words, to the jurist’s very being. Gadamer famously asserts that an ‘increase in being’ occurs in the person who understands. This article examines how this idea applies to hermeneutic engagement with the law. Legal understanding involves more than the solution of legal problems and the peaceful regulation of human affairs. It can also have a profound impact on those who apply the law themselves or, for that matter, understand the application of the law by others. In this respect, the basis can not only be one’s own practical application of the law, but also participation in others’, possibly even past, engagement with the law. In this way, what unfolds is ‘legal experience’, understood as an encounter with the law in which the law is made manifest and experienced.

Hans-Georg Gadamer set the humanities the task of contributing to the experience of the reality of life from a global perspective. He believes that Christian Europe, through its laborious practice of tolerance, has a rich historical experience in dealing with cultural diversity and in affirming the idea of humane integration and coexistence. However, such a perspective cannot avoid reflecting on the experience of moral transformation in light of Western modernity. Thus, a confrontation with the Bolshevik and Nazi revolutions and their devastating effects becomes inevitable. Drawing on the work of Richard Rorty and Reinhart Koselleck, I formulate insights into moral plurality that critically differentiate Gadamer’s postulate of ‘recognition in the other’ and link it to real historical conditions.

This article explores whether Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, in the context of intercultural understanding, risks neglecting or even attempting to overcome the cultural other. In an era of global exchange—marked by both intercultural interactions and the growing prevalence of culturalist ethnocentrism—this would pose a significant challenge to the role of the humanities as envisioned by Gadamer. An approach that disregards or seeks to transcend cultural otherness would conflict with the principle of mutual cultural recognition. After briefly addressing the recurring critique of Gadamer’s hermeneutics as promoting the overcoming of cultural otherness, this criticism is systematically countered and dismissed through four key arguments.

Our modern affection for ancient Athenian democracy turns out to have very shallow roots. This paper attempts to show just how critical most European writers were of Athenian democracy— and even of Periclean expenditures on art!—long into the nineteenth century. Even in the era of the Enlightenment, only a few Dutch and then English writers championed the greatness of Athens; most other writers continued to be fans of Sparta, whose stability, abstemiousness, and military valor were prized. Of course, early modern writers criticized other aspects of Athens than those we might choose today; their critiques rested on the evils of demagoguery, vote buying, ingratitude towards dedicated and talented leaders, and the imperious treatment of their allies. Were they wholly wrong about ancient democracy—or many of its modern versions? Perhaps this sort of clarity will help us make reforms before it is too late.

Sartre’s philosophy of the body is often presented as a viable alternative to Cartesian dualism and even as a solution to the mind-body problem. However, in this paper, I challenge this view. I argue that instead of resolving or dissolving the mind-body problem, Sartre’s theory leads to a bifurcation of embodiment. The problem is merely displaced, and the new Sartrean dualism that emerges is, in some respects, even more radical than its Cartesian predecessor. Consequently, Sartre’s philosophy of the body does not advance our understanding of the relationship between mind and body. Rather, it exacerbates their opposition and renders a unified account of human beings impossible.

This essay explores the connection between Reinhart Koselleck’s methodological metaphor of the ‘veto right of the sources’ and Karl Popper’s concepts of falsification and falsifiability within in his philosophy of Critical Rationalism. To clarify this relationship, the theoretical framework underlying Koselleck’s metaphor is analyzed. It is then demonstrated that, contrary to previous interpretations, there is no substantial analogy between the two concepts. While Koselleck’s ‘veto right of the sources’ prohibits specific interpretations based on source analysis, Popper normatively constructs scientific theories as «prohibitions” that allow for falsification by specific observations. Finally, Koselleck’s practical reception of Popper’s ideas is examined through published references and marginalia in books from his library, situating this comparative analysis within the broader context of Koselleck’s sustained search for the foundations of a theory of history.