Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Band 49

The aim of craft-analogies in Plato’s early dialogues is to put forward a theory of knowledge in which only the content of intentional processes can be known.I will argue that, with this goal in mind, Plato offers an idea of craft that differs from, and is even opposed to the views of his time, as well as to those of our ownday, by changing the prevailing defi nition of craft—from the expertise of means to the expertise of ends. I will address the far-reaching consequences of this shift.Part 1 will expose what I understand by Plato’s approach to craft. Part 2 will expose Plato’s denial of the actual existence of the process of knowledge reducingit to its object or reference. Part 3 will address what I think are misinterpretations of Plato approach. Part 4 will present some textual evidence. And in Part 5I will analyse Plato’s shuttle-analogy, the more sophisticated of his craft-analogies. Finally, I will append a critical note on Terence Irwin’s understanding ofvirtue as craft-knowledge.

The aim of this essay is to grasp the difference between two concepts typical of Aristotle, λη (matter, material, but also an entity which lacks shape and concretion) and ποκεíμενον (substance, logical subject as well as material). λη and ποκεíμενον express eo ipso, essentially and always a relation. These two concepts have – already since Bonitz’ times – been interpreted very controversially. The relevant literature of research (from the middle of the 19th century untiltoday) is therefore thoroughly expounded in the essay. Because Aristotle determines the substance (οσíα) in its relation to the accidental characteristics, butalso the in λη its relation to the conceptually comprehensible form (ε*δος) and also to the feature of concrete defi niteness (τóδε τι) by means of the ποκεíμενονitself, the following result ensues: ποκεíμενον is broader in its range of meaning than λη.

Focusing on the notions of »obiectivity« (objectivitas), as it was used by Gabriel Zerbi in the second half of the 15th century in order to denote the epistemological status of something being an object of knowledge, and »realisation« (realizare), as it was coined by the Franciscan Nicolaus Bonetus in the early 14th century and later taken up by Leibniz as an expression for some kind of bestowal of subsistence (as regarding to the eternal truth in the divine intellect), existence (as regarding to the realisation of a possible world), or reality (as provided by the »vinculum substantiale«), the article explores two examples of the terminological working of the aristotelian scholastic tradition on the fundamental vocabulary of metaphysics.

»Anthropomorphism« generally means the humanization of something that is not human itself (e. g. inanimate nature, animals, or God). The contribution follows, in its first part, the history of this concept from its origins in classical antiquity via the long theological tradition in which »Anthropomorphite« became a combat term up to Kant, who differentiates the neologism coined by Leibniz and distinguishes a dogmatic from a symbolic anthropomorphism. With Kant, at the latest, the concept is no longer limited to theological discourse; henceforth, it stands for the humanization of God and world. »Anthropomorphism« marks the line between transcendental philosophy and anthropology and correlates the transcendental subject with its incarnation in the human body. –The second part which shall examine the history of the concept in the 19th and 20th century will be published in the next volume of the Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte.

I argue in this article that Georg Friedrich Meier’s formal concept of »prejudice« alters within various literary, philosophical, and popular genres and during more than 25 years that he was dealing with the problem. In the German Enlightenment, Meier’s concept was seminal because he was the first to formalize the concept of prejudice by, on the one hand, demonstrating that it should not be seen simply as a wrong or harmful mental attitude and, on the other hand, by integrating this concept in a theory of prejudice. This article demonstrates that Meier’s concept of »prejudice« deals with issues of rationality, of moral theology, and of social pragmatics. His theory, contradictory as it may seem, was decisive for the rehabilitation of prejudices and for the transformation of the discourse in the second half of the 18th century.

This paper explores the semantics of »natural« (natürlich) in Hegels Phenomenology. The leading question is: What does the word »natural« mean when it refers to experiences and the contents of consciousness in general? Using as semantic material a digital reading of the text, the article analyses the peculiarities of the uses of the term in each context and studies the onto-epistemological assumptions of the notion of the natural in the target work, bearing in mind the question concerning the Cartesian divide between world and mind. It concludes that the way in which Hegel really narrates the natural, at lest as referred to experiences and consciousness, preserves that Cartesian divide and also a realistic position.

This article focuses on Kierkegaard’s two-fold use of the categories of modality »possibility« and »reality« in his philosophy of existence. The difference between possibility and reality in the works of Kierkegaard is commonly referred to as to the difference between »Denken« and »Sein«, between »Thought« and »Being«. However Either/Or reveals that this dichotomy does only cover one aspect of their use. The other and maybe even more fundamental distinction is that of »possibility« and »reality« as a difference between two modes of ›existing‹.

The article refers to the hermeneutic methods of psychoanalysis. It scrutinizes Freud’s strategy in transforming traditional myths of the devil into a theory of evil which reveals the dark side of the human soul. Relating to Freud’s epistemic construction of metapsychology, it is argued that his hermeneutic system fashions its specific principles of causality, which are stipulated by the theory of libido, in order to reinterpretate the mythology of the devil as a relic left by the unconscious. Freud’s argumentation, exemplified in his studies on religious superstition, demonstrates the interconnection between mythology and the unconscious. As the devil figures dirt and darkness, he represents distressing thoughts which are repressed and rejected by consciousness. The article is completed by a view on C. G. Jung’s theory of the archetypes, which considers the evil as part of the preconscious thoughts beyond individual experience. Thus the fundamental difference between Freud’s metapsychology and Jung’s archetypes is reflected in the interpretation of the devil as a figure, retaining the dark energies concentrated in the human soul.

The introduction of the term »populäre Kultur« (popular culture) marks a decisive break with the German intellectual past of the years before 1960. During this time a harsh critique of the »Massenkultur« (mass culture) ranked among the most important discourses of German columnists, literary authors and academic scholars. The new term »populäre Kultur« stems partly back to the positively used terms »popular« and »Popularität« of the romantic tradition (Herder, Schiller et al.). Especially many authors of the years 1980 ff. who use the term »populäre Kultur« quite frequently embrace the culture of the everyday life or the products of the (former) low culture in a much more complete way than their predecessors.